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Abstract 
In periods of market stress, portfolio reallocations in bond markets reflect both safety and 
liquidity concerns. Using sovereign and national agency bonds, we construct indicators  
of liquidity premia in major euro area bond markets; we document the weakening of the 
correlation between core and periphery market liquidity during the euro area sovereign bond 
crisis; and we identify several episodes of significant flight-to-liquidity (FTL) flows above and 
beyond flight-to-safety (FTS) spells in the period 2009-13. We show that FTL flows led to 
significant inverse moves in sovereign bond yields in euro area core and periphery markets. 
Moreover, FTL flows triggered declines in core and periphery stock markets and are 
associated with lower macroeconomic confidence in the euro area as a whole, which 
underscores the importance of FTL episodes for investors and policymakers alike.  
Keywords: liquidity premia, flight to liquidity, flight to safety, sovereign debt crisis. 
JEL Classification: G01, G12, H63. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
En períodos de tensión en los mercados financieros, recomposiciones en las carteras de 
renta fija pueden generarse por la preocupación no solo por el riesgo de crédito, sino 
también por el riesgo de liquidez. Usando información de bonos emitidos por Gobiernos y 
agencias públicas, construimos indicadores de las primas de liquidez en los principales 
mercados de bonos de la zona del euro, mostrando el debilitamiento de la correlación en  
la liquidez de los mercados de los países del núcleo y de la periferia durante la crisis de la 
deuda soberana europea, e identificando varios episodios de significativos flujos de huida a 
la liquidez (flight-to-liquidity, FTL), además de los flujos de huida a la seguridad (flight-to-
safety, FTS), durante el período 2009-2013. El análisis demuestra que los flujos FTL 
provocaron movimientos significativos en direcciones opuestas en los rendimientos de los 
bonos soberanos entre los mercados de los países centrales y de la periferia de la zona del 
euro. Por otra parte, los flujos de FTL produjeron descensos en todos los mercados de 
valores de la zona del euro y están asociados, a escala macroeconómica, con una menor 
confianza económica en el conjunto de la zona del euro, lo que pone de relieve la 
importancia de los episodios FTL tanto para los inversores como para la toma de 
decisiones de política económica. 
Palabras clave: prima de liquidez, huida a la liquidez, huida a la seguridad, crisis de deuda 
soberana. 
Códigos JEL: G01, G12, H63. 
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1 Introduction 
In periods of market stress, extreme and inverse market movements in the bond and equity 
markets are often referred to as “flights to safety” or “flights to quality”. Such episodes were 
relatively frequent during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The decrease in value of 
periphery sovereign debt was undoubtedly related to changes in perceived default 
probabilities and thereby in the increase in the required premium for bearing that credit risk. 
Under those circumstances, some market participants were willing to decrease their portfolio 
exposure to securities bearing the perceived higher credit risk triggering sudden swings in 
bond prices. In an influential paper, Baele et al. (2013) document flight-to-safety episodes in 
more than 20 bond markets and show that such episodes are important to understand 
developments in major bond markets.  
Flights to safety episodes may be however related not only to flights to quality but 
also about flights to liquidity. In periods of market turbulence, the liquidity of the bonds, i.e. 
the capacity to undo positions at reasonable costs, is also an important concern for bond 
market investors. Abrupt changes in bond prices may therefore be the result of flight to 
liquidity episodes when market participants suddenly prefer to hold highly liquid securities 
rather than less liquid ones, thereby requesting a higher premium for holding the less liquid 
bonds, in addition to or even regardless their credit risk. 
Developments in euro area bond markets in the period 2009-13 are an important 
example of the relevance of flight to safety and flight to liquidity episodes. As an illustration, 
Figures 1 depict a simple decomposition of sovereign bond yields in three major euro area 
countries (Germany, Spain and France) using OIS rates as proxy for risk-free interest rates 
and CDS premia as proxy for credit risk compensation.  
Figure 1: Five-year sovereign bond yields compared to the sum of OIS rates and CDS premia  
 
Note: 5-year spot yield of the sovereign (blue line) and the sum of the 5-year Overnight Interest Rate Swap (OIS) rate and the 5-
year CDS (percentage points, red line), as well as the difference between both series (green line). Left chart represent data for 
Spain, centre chart for France, and right one for Germany. 
 
While the combined effect of monetary policy expectations and credit risk 
compensation help mimic quite well developments in observed sovereign yields in those 
markets, it is also evident that both effects are insufficient to fully explain the observed bond 
yields, leaving more than 100 basis points unaccounted for at times and stressing the role of 
flight to liquidity flows. 
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Against this background, the goal of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of 
liquidity premium in euro area bond markets during the financial and sovereign debt crisis. In 
particular, we show that flight to liquidity flows were an important dimension of the 
turbulences experienced in bond markets during the global financial crisis and in particular in 
the euro area bond markets, beyond and above flight to safety episodes. 
A major challenge to analyse the impact of liquidity considerations in sovereign bond 
yields is that the liquidity premium is unobservable, so its identification relies on the use of some 
proxies that imperfectly capture some aspects of liquidity (e.g.: traded volumes, bid-ask 
spreads). Unfortunately, such measures are not always available or their reliability differs across 
bond markets, which makes it difficult drawing sound conclusions for multi-country analysis.  
In this paper, we take a more direct approach by looking at more direct proxies of 
liquidity premium. To measure changes in liquidity premium in individual bond markets, we 
calculate yield spreads between sovereign bonds and equivalent bonds issued by government 
sponsored agencies of Germany (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, KfW), France (Caisse 
d’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale, CADES) and Spain (Instituto de Crédito Oficial, ICO). 
Specifically, we estimate both sovereign and agency zero-coupon term structures of bond yields 
and calculate the spreads at the five year maturity for three of the largest bond markets in the 
euro area: Germany, France and Spain. The rationale is that, being fully guaranteed by the 
governments, the bonds issued by such agencies have the same credit risk as the bonds 
issued by the respective treasuries, and yield spreads, therefore, provide evidence of the liquidity 
premium in each bond market. Longstaff (2004) indeed showed that agency spreads capture a 
substantial part of the flight to safety episodes in the US bond market using yield spreads 
between US Treasuries and bonds issued by the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp).  
We analyse the time-varying co-movement of liquidity premium across those three 
euro area bond markets in recent years and document significant swings in liquidity premium 
in euro area bond markets between 2008 and 2013. Following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, liquidity premium rose across all bond markets as a result of strong flight-to safety 
flows. Later on, however, the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis in some euro area 
countries led to a gradual increase in the market discrimination across sovereign issuers with 
strong episodes of flight-to-liquidity since late 2009 between Spanish and AAA-rated 
sovereign bonds (French and German ones) and from 2011 even between AAA-rated bonds.  
To isolate pure flight to liquidity effects from those associated with more general flight 
to safety episodes in sovereign bond markets, we estimate a dynamic two-factor model using 
the liquidity spreads for Germany, France and Spain. Since one of the factors is strongly 
related to stock market volatility and therefore helps account for the influence to flight to 
safety flows, the second factor allows us to identify liquidity effects more directly linked to 
flight to liquidity flows. 
We show that flight to liquidity was an important element of the financial turbulences 
during the euro area debt crisis. The reaction in euro area sovereign bond markets was clearly 
asymmetric: while sovereign yields from “stressed” countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland) increased as a result of flight to liquidity flows, yields of “core” countries 
(Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Finland and The Netherlands) decreased significantly. 
Moreover the yield impact of flight to liquidity flows was sizeable: our estimates suggest a 
variation in Spanish five-year sovereign bond yield of around 80 basis points during the crisis 
solely as a result of flight to liquidity pressure. 
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The importance of flight to liquidity flows is further underscored by the fact that their 
effects extended well beyond sovereign bond markets. We show that euro area stock 
markets were negatively affected by flight to liquidity flows. In stark contrast to bond markets, 
stock markets in both core and stressed countries exhibited significant declines in returns 
during flight to liquidity episodes, even after controlling for a potential simultaneous flight to 
safety effects. Furthermore, we also find evidence of deterioration in economic confidence 
associated to flight to liquidity episodes, which suggest that such episodes were perceived 
not only by financial market investors but by economic agents in general as an important 
element of the euro area crisis that should be taken into account. 
Our results provide strong evidence in support of market liquidity playing an 
important role to understand movements in sovereign yield spreads in the euro area in recent 
years. Beber et al. (2009) already showed that even before the financial and debt crisis in 
times of market stress, investors in the Euro-area sovereign bond market demand liquidity 
rather than credit quality in their portfolios. Our evidence based on the available agency 
spreads for three different countries suggests that such practices are likely to have intensified 
in recent years as a result of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Schwarz (2010) also uses 
KfW spreads as proxies for liquidity in euro area bond markets. There is also an ample 
theoretical literature arguing in favour of the presence of significant effects of liquidity in asset 
pricing (e.g.: Vayanos, 2004; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009, among others). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the computation 
of the liquidity spreads for Germany France and Spain. In Section 3 we describe our 
identification strategy for flight to liquidity flows and their characteristics during the euro area 
debt crisis. We then investigate the quantitative impact of flight to liquidity flows in all euro 
area sovereign bond and stock markets, as well as on economic confidence in Section 4. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Measuring liquidity premia in euro area bond markets 
From a practical point of view, the yield of a given bond (𝑖𝑡(𝑠)) can be decomposed into risk-
free interest rates (𝑟𝑡), credit risk compensation (ct(s)) and liquidity risk compensation (lt(s)): 
𝑖𝑡(𝑠) = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡(𝑠) + 𝑙𝑡(𝑠)        (1) 
For this reason, when considering a sovereign spread (the difference between the 
yields of two sovereign bonds issued, for instance, by Spain and Germany), their spread will 
include the difference in the credit risk premia as well as differences in the liquidity premia. 
[𝑖𝑡(𝑠1) − 𝑖𝑡(𝑠2)] = [𝑐𝑡(𝑠1) − 𝑐𝑡(𝑠2)] + [𝑙𝑡(𝑠1) − 𝑙𝑡(𝑠2)]     (2) 
By contrast, an agency bond spread (the yield spread between a bond issued by an 
agency owned by the government and the corresponding sovereign bond) will allow 
cancelling out the credit risk and therefore isolating the liquidity premia (Longstaff, 2004):
1
𝑋𝑡
𝑠1 = [𝑖𝑡(𝑠1) − 𝑖𝑡(𝑎1)] = [𝑙𝑡(𝑠1) − 𝑙𝑡(𝑎1)]      (3) 
 
Clean measures of liquidity premium in each bond market can therefore be obtained 
by computing the yield spread between standard sovereign and agency bonds. We would 
however need bonds with exactly the same maturity and structure of payments (frequency 
and size of coupons, as well as principal) or the spreads would be affected by differences in 
term premia and changes in the benchmarks. 
We therefore compute yield spreads on daily zero-coupon term structures estimated 
using a Nelson Siegel parametric specification (Nelson and Siegel, 1987) for Spanish, French 
and German government bonds, as well as for their respective agency bonds (ICO, CADES 
and KfW), between January 2008 and December 2013. Our choice of the Nelson Siegel 
specification is motivated by the limited number of agency bonds in some markets. Despite 
its simplicity, the Nelson Siegel specification is widely used among central banks (see, BIS 
2005). To ensure the stability of the estimated parameters we employed the genetic algorithm 
introduced in Gimeno and Nave (2009).2
Within the estimated term structures, in the light of the available agency market 
structures, we focus on five year spreads as benchmark maturity (see Figure 2). Moving 
beyond the five-year maturity reduces the number of available bonds and lowers the reliability 
of the zero-coupon term structures (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).
  
3
 
 We will nonetheless 
show that our main findings hold for two and ten-year maturities, too. 
 
                                                                            
1. The analyses in Schwarz (2010) and Ejsing et al. (2012) are also based on the assumption that KfW and CADES bond 
yields have the same level of credit risk as their government counterparts. 
2. The procedure involves a heuristic search of the optimum that mimics the process of natural evolution and explores 
the whole parameter universe, and including random perturbations around solutions to avoid local minima. 
3. The Appendix also includes a list and the main characteristics of the bonds used in our estimation. 
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Figure 2: 5-year zero-coupon bond yields 
 
Note: Yields are computed from a Nelson-Siegel yield curve estimated daily with Gimeno and Nave (2009) algorithm. The left 
hand side chart represents the 5-year rate for the Spanish (red), German (black), and French (blue) Sovereign (Government) 
bonds. The right hand side chart represents the 5-year rate for the ICO (Spanish, red), KfW (German, black), and CADES 
(French, blue) Agency bonds. Below are the same series but represented by country (Spain, left; France, centre; and Germany, 
right), with agency rates in red and sovereign rates in blue. 
Figure 2 shows that in some periods (e.g. late 2008-early 2009) there is a higher 
variation in government bonds than in agency bonds. Once we recover the corresponding 
agency spreads (agency rate minus the sovereign bond yield, see Figure 3), it is apparent that 
liquidity premia dynamics  played an important role in the widening of the intra-euro area 
sovereign yield spreads. 
Table 1 provides descriptives statistics for both our sovereign and agency yields as 
well as country- specific agency spreads, both for levels and first differencies. As yields and 
agency spreads are highly persistent, we below specify our models in terms of first 
differences to work with stationary time series. We can also observe that, as a consequence 
of the crisis, Spanish yields, both sovereign and agency, have extreme values, as the kurtosis 
coefficients highlights (this also produce some correlation with the first lag). 
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Figure 3: Agency Spreads for five-year maturity bond yields 
 
Note: Computed as the difference of the 5-year spot yield of the agency minus the 5-year spot yield of the corresponding 
sovereign (percentage points). For France (blue line), the agency is CADES; for Spain (red line), the agency is ICO; and for 
Germany (black line), the agency is KfW. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the involved variables 
 
ean STDev. Skewness Kurtosis Corr(1) Corr(2) Corr(3) 
Level 
       ICO (Spain) 4.17 0.96 0.63 2.79 .994 .986 .978 
KfW (Germany) 2.29 1.12 0.35 2.19 .998 .996 .994 
CADES (France) 2.48 0.99 0.24 2.39 .997 .995 .992 
ES sovereign 3.84 0.83 0.73 3.37 .992 .981 .971 
DE sovereign 1.87 1.11 0.48 2.33 .997 .994 .992 
FR sovereign 2.27 0.96 0.38 2.53 .997 .994 .991 
ES agency spread 0.33 0.23 0.86 3.41 .982 .974 .966 
DE agency spread 0.41 0.18 0.93 2.71 .990 .981 .973 
FR agency spread 0.22 0.12 0.61 2.82 .972 .948 .926 
 
Mean STDev. Skewness Kurtosis Corr(1) Corr(2) Corr(3) 
First Difference 
       ICO (Spain) -.001 .097 -1.34 17.46 .212 .015 -.079 
KfW (Germany) -.002 .044 0.20 7.34 .034 -.006 -.019 
CADES (France) -.002 .048 0.15 7.32 .062 .043 -.055 
ES sovereign -.001 .100 -1.29 16.23 .183 -.004 -.087 
DE sovereign -.002 .055 0.05 5.22 .004 -.035 -.021 
FR sovereign -.002 .054 0.22 6.74 .030 -.010 -.021 
ES agency spread .000 .043 1.32 35.12 -.263 -.017 -.062 
DE agency spread .000 .024 -0.26 13.11 -.086 -.045 .018 
FR agency spread -.000 .027 -0.18 11.55 -.086 -.040 -.048 
Note: Yields for each issuer are 5-year zero-coupon rates obtained by daily estimating Nelson-Siegel yield curves using Gimeno and Nave (2009) 
algorithm. Sample: from January 4th 2008 to December 31st 2013. 
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3 Identifying flight to liquidity episodes 
In the case of the European debt crisis, episodes of flight to liquidity have been often proxied 
in the literature as a widening in the KfW yield spread over the German bund (e.g. Schwartz, 
2010). While such a yield spread is easy to compute, its simplicity may unfortunately come at 
a cost in terms of economic interpretation of such episodes.4
This paper argues that a major shortcoming of focusing exclusively on the German 
bond market to identify FTL episodes over the last few years is that the nature of those 
FTS/FTL flows may have varied substantially as the sovereign debt crisis unfolded in euro 
area bond markets. Specifically, while in the early stages of the crisis FTS episodes involved a 
portfolio relocation between the then-considered riskier assets (equity, corporate bonds) and 
sovereign bonds, a crucial characteristic of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is that it 
also involved important portfolio reallocations within the euro area sovereign bond asset class.  
 
Figure 4: Comovement between Spanish and German liquidity spreads during the crisis 
   
 
Shadows represent periods of statistically significant negative correlation based on a time-varying coefficient in a regression of 
changes in Spanish liquidity spread on changes in German ones. The solid line represents the estimated parameter, and the dotted 
lines the 95% confidence intervals. Kalman filter parameters estimated: 𝛼� = −0.015; 𝜎�𝑣 = 18.958; 𝜎�𝑤 = 0.00058; ?̂?0 = 0.556. 
As an illustration, Figure 4 depicts the bivariate correlation between the agency 
spreads of Germany (as market destination of flight to liquidity flows) and Spain (as example 
of a country negatively affected by the sovereign debt crisis) since the beginning of the 
financial turbulences. We model such a comovement using a regression of the changes in 
sovereign liquidity spreads of one country as a function of the changes in the liquidity spread 
of a second country. 
                                                                            
4. As an illustration in the Appendix, Figures A3 and A4 depict the identification of FTL episodes based on relatively 
unusual daily widening of the KfW spread alone, and instances of joint KfW spread widening together with a decline in 
German bund yields. In both cases the result is a relatively large number of short-lived episodes since the beginning of 
the financial turbulences.    
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∆𝑋𝑡
𝑠1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡∆𝑋𝑡𝑠2 + 𝑣𝑡   𝑣𝑡~𝑁[0,𝜎𝑣]    (4) 
where the relationship between both spreads (βt) is time varying, with the coefficients 
behaving as a random walk, 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡~𝑁[0,𝜎𝑤]    (5) 
The resulting system is estimated by using standard Kalman filtering techniques.  
Although the correlation started declining since late 2008, it remained significantly 
positive until late 2009. The intensification of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area 
however pushed it into negative territory in early 2010 and a negative co-movement between 
German and Spanish agency spreads has remained broadly negative since then. Indeed, in 
statistical terms, this analysis suggests three protracted episodes of significant negative co-
movement in liquidity premium in German and Spanish bond markets between 2010 and 
2013, only attenuated by the introduction of the Eurosystem long-term refinancing operations 
in late 2011 and thereafter by President Draghi’s “whatever it takes to save the euro” pledge 
in the summer of 2012 (Draghi, 2012). 
Those episodes of negative co-movement between German and Spanish agency 
spreads do suggest significant liquidity flows between both bond markets. Yet, it has to be 
taken into account that there was also a strong deterioration in Spanish public finances with 
the financial and economic crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and a FTS 
portfolio relocation from Spanish into German bonds would be observationally equivalent to a 
flight-to-liquidity episode. 
The evolution of the co-movement between French and German agency spreads is 
also very telling about the deepening of the euro area debt crisis (see Figure A2). Indeed, 
although French sovereign bonds were not affected by the crisis to the same extend as the 
Spanish bonds in the early stages of the crisis, there was a protracted decline in the strength 
of the correlation between German and French agency spreads since early 2009, to the 
extent that by the Spring of 2012 it become significantly negative and only recovered after 
President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” policy statement.  
3.1 Identifying flight to liquidity using a multivariate model  
Models where one of the agency spreads is a function of other of the agency spreads are 
necessarily descriptive and suffer from endogeneity problems, especially during the crisis, since 
both agency spreads are affected by what is happening to the other. Here we propose a more 
structural analysis where the three agency spreads are determined by a set of latent factors. 
To better identify FTL episodes in euro area sovereign bond markets, we first look at 
the statistical properties of the three agency spreads available for the euro area. A principal 
component analysis suggests that two factors are enough to explain more than 95% of the 
variation in those three agency spreads (see Table 2). The principal-component analysis 
indicates that only one of the components has an eigenvalue greater than one. However, the 
second component retains a high level of explanatory power. Therefore, we have opted for a 
model with two latent factors that have the potential of explaining up to a 95% of the 
variability of the series.  
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Table 2: Principal Component Eigenvalues and explained Variance of Spanish, 
German and French agency spreads 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.157 1.451 0.719 0.719 
Comp2 0.706 0.568 0.235 0.954 
Comp3 0.138  0.046 1.000 
 
Table 2b: Eigenvectors for the Principal Component analysis 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Unexplained 
ES 0.462 0.872 0.164 0 
DE 0.609 -0.446 0.656 0 
FR 0.645 -0.203 -0.737 0 
Note: Variables used in the Principal Component Analysis are daily time series (from January 4th 2008 to December 31st 2013) 
of the ICO Spread (ES, the difference between the 5-year zero-coupon rate of ICO and the equivalent Spanish Sovereign), KfW 
Spread (DE, the difference between the 5-year zero-coupon rate of KfW and the equivalent German Sovereign) and CADES 
Spread (the difference between the 5-year zero-coupon rate of CADES and the equivalent French Sovereign). 
 
 
The eigenvectors of the principal components (Table 2b) suggests an important 
characteristic of the two components. The first one has similar loadings for all agency spreads 
and can be considered as the level factor, while the second one accounts for the 
heterogeneity among them. Therefore, we propose a two latent factors model, where the 
measurement equation is equal to: 
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In this model, there are two latent factors. We have imposed the error terms 𝑢𝑡
𝑗 to be 
uncorrelated, so shocks affecting more than one market would come from movements on the 
latent factors, while differences in agency spreads variability would rise from different 
sensibility to movements in the latent factors. In order to identify factors we have chosen that 
the coefficients for the German spread to be equal to 1 (𝛾1
𝐷𝐸 = 𝛾2𝐷𝐸 = 1), so the magnitude for 
both factors can be interpreted as the basis point impact of each factor into the German 
agency spread. If coefficients for the same factor are all positive (as we will show is the case 
for the first one, 𝐿1𝑡), the factor can be interpreted as a common liquidity component, 
governing their joint behaviour, and therefore as a general preference for sovereign versus 
agency bonds. If the coefficients have values both positive and negatives, (as is the case of 
the second component, 𝐿2𝑡), the corresponding factor would reflect the transfer of liquidity 
between sovereigns (liquidity premium changes that affects asymmetrically the different 
markets). Lastly, we let noise components (𝑢𝑡
𝑗) to be uncorrelated, so common shocks to 
agency spreads will come through the noise components of the state equation. 
We set the state equation for the latent factors to be equal to: 
�
𝐿1𝑡
𝐿2𝑡
� = �1 00 1� �𝐿1𝑡−1𝐿2𝑡−1� + �𝜎𝑙1 00 𝜎𝑙2� �𝑣𝑙1𝑡𝑣𝑙2𝑡�      (7) 
The model can therefore be considered as a filtering tool to isolate movements in 
agency spreads not (or at least less) related to market fears or sovereign credit risk that 
should be strongly associated to FTS flows captured by the first factor. The second factor 
would more directly capture the effects of FTL episodes. Specifically, as this factor moves 
German and Spanish liquidity spreads in opposite directions, its negative realisations capture 
a simultaneous widening of German spreads and a narrowing of Spanish spreads, consistent 
with the common understanding of a FTL away from Spanish sovereigns and into German 
bunds. Interestingly, the loadings of the second factor suggest that FTL episodes away from 
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the Spanish bond market also took place in the early stages of the financial crisis, following 
the collapse of Bear Stearns in early 2008 and following Lehman collapse into the first months 
of 2009, well ahead of the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2010 
and the downgrading of Spanish sovereign debt. 
We set the matrix of coefficients in (7) to be diagonal. This is equivalent to rotate the 
factors to make them orthogonal. As can be seen in Figure 5, agency spreads move in line 
and divergences among them seem to revert in time. Thus, we have opted to set both factors 
to be a random walk, so shocks are considered to be permanent. Alternative specifications 
where we let coefficients in equation (7) to be different from one produce values close to the 
unity. Using a standard Kalman Filter approach to estimate the latent factors, the results are 
shown in Table 3. 
Figure 5: Latent factors of the liquidity model 
 
 
Note: Latent factors obtained from a Kalman Filter estimate of the Dynamic Factor Model proposed in equations 6-7. Observed 
variables are French, Spanish and German agency spreads from January 2008, to December 2013. 
Similarly to the results obtained for the principal components analysis, we get a first 
factor with similar coefficients for the three agency spreads, whereas the second factor has 
an opposite sign for Spain versus Germany and France. In figure 5, we can observe the 
estimated evolution of each factor. 
The first factor strongly increases both around the Lehman Brothers crisis (2008Q4-
2009Q1), and also around the euro area sovereign debt crisis (being at is maximum in the 
second half of 2011, just before the beginning of the VLTROs-Very Long Term Refinancing 
Operations-). In fact, this factor has a very similar evolution to measures of market risk or fear, 
as for example the VSTOXX volatility index for the EUROSTOXX 50 index, the equivalent to 
the VIX index for the US market (see Figure 6). This evidence lends support to our 
interpretation of the first factor as capturing FTS flows. 
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Table 3: Dynamic latent factor model estimation. 
Measurement equation 
 
ES DE FR 
µ 33.60 41.18 21.54 
γ1 0.90 1.00 0.60 
γ2 -1.84 1.00 0.28 
σ 2.30 0.65 6.07 
    
State Equation 
 
F1 F2 
 ϕ 1 1 
 σf 1.91 1.22 
 Note: Dynamic latent factor model proposed in equation 6 (Measurement equation) 
and 7 (State equation). Variables used are daily time series (from January 4th 2008 
to December 31st 2013) of the ICO Spread (ES, the difference between the 5-year 
zero-coupon rate of ICO and the equivalent Spanish Sovereign), KfW Spread (DE, 
the difference between the 5-year zero-coupon rate of KfW and the equivalent 
German Sovereign) and CADES Spread (the difference between the 5-year zero-
coupon rate of CADES and the equivalent French Sovereign). 
 
By contrast, the second factor provides signals of liquidity differentiation between 
countries both in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse and also in mid-2012, when a 
financial support programme for the Spanish economy was in consideration given the significant 
deterioration of bond market conditions. We therefore interpret this factor as providing evidence 
on the impact of more genuine FTL flows beyond and above liquidity effects stemming from FTL 
flows. Therefore, this second factor underpins our identification of FTL episodes and is the 
starting point for our investigation of the quantitative effects of those episodes on several 
financial and macroeconomic variables. It is important to note, however, that by controlling by 
the liquidity effects of FTS flows by mean of the first latent factor, our investigation is likely to 
provide a lower bound on the liquidity premium in those financial instruments. 
Figure 6: Risk aversion (First latent) factor and ITRAXX index. 
 
 
 
Blue line (right-hand-side) represents the first latent factors obtained from the Kalman Filter estimate of the Dynamic Factor 
Model proposed in equations 6-7 (French, Spanish and German 5-year agency spreads as observed variables). Red line 
represents the VIXX volatility index for the EuroStoxx for the larger maturity available (24 months) for a better match with the 
maturity of the agency spreads. 
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4 FTL and the economic and financial environment 
This section documents the impact of FTL flows on different financial and economic 
indicators. The purpose is to characterise FTL episodes identified using the factor model 
introduced in the previous section rather than to look for causality. In particular, an important 
aspect of our analysis here is to analyse the behaviour of those variables across most euro 
area bond markets and not only in the three major ones for which agency spreads are 
available.  
We first focus in detail on euro area sovereign bond markets. We will report our 
regression results for the three countries for which we have computed the agency spreads, 
namely Spain, Germany and France, and also Italy, the other large bond market in the euro 
area,. Our tables will also provide summary statistics (average, standard deviation and 
max/min values) of the impact of FTL flows for two euro area country groups: (i) “core” 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands) and (ii) “stressed” 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), whose sovereign debt was more 
seriously affected by the market turbulences and that eventually was subject to the 
Eurosystem Securities Market Programme (SMP).  
4.1 Sovereign bond markets during FTL episodes 
Table 4 provides evidence of the effects of FTL episodes on euro area sovereign bond 
markets. Before discussing our results some considerations are worth bearing in mind. We 
will report results for the zero-coupon yields at the 2, 5 and 10-year maturities. While zero-
coupon term structures are necessary to compute the liquidity spreads for Spain, Germany 
and France, it is worth noting that the estimation of those zero-coupon term structures imply 
some fitting errors that may convey important information on liquidity. Recent literature has 
shown that such fitting errors contain information about the liquidity premia in the underlying 
bonds used in the estimation (see Hu et al., 2013, Berenguer et al., 2013). To the extent that 
fitted yields are likely to be partially deprived from liquidity premia content, our quantitative 
findings are likely to be biased downwards.  
As a robustness exercise, we also consider the yields of benchmark sovereign bonds 
(by Bloomberg) for each maturity. Although on-the-run premia effects seem to be weaker in 
the euro area than in the US market, those bonds are likely to remain somewhat more liquid 
than the off-the-run ones, so if anything, their use in our analysis should also tend to bias the 
analysis against a significant liquidity deterioration and, therefore, our empirical findings should 
be interpreted as a low estimate of such a deterioration. 
Finally, our purpose is to analyse the impact of FTL flows in all euro area bond 
markets. Since sovereign bond yields of some euro area countries were particularly volatile 
and exhibited signals of (local) non-stationarity in our sample, we report results for regressions 
both in levels and first differences. 
The regressions results reported in Table 4 Panel A point to significant increases in 
the levels of Spanish bond yields, and decreases in German and French sovereign bond 
yields, which corresponds to the basic intuition between FTL flows among those bond 
markets. Importantly, these qualitative findings hold not only for the three countries for which 
we can compute the agency spreads but also for the country blocks they represent. Indeed, 
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our regression results suggest significant changes in sovereign yields in opposite directions 
reflecting strong portfolio relocation flows from stressed to core bond markets within the euro 
area. For example, our results also suggest significant increases in the other large sovereign 
bond markets under stress during the crisis, Italy, with the impact being somewhat stronger 
at longer maturities. Average results and standard deviations of the impact estimates for all 
stressed countries are significantly higher than those reported for Italy and Spain, which 
suggest that FTL flows were particularly adverse for smaller and more seriously stressed bond 
markets.  
Table 4: Impact of flight to liquidity on sovereign bond markets: yields and trading activity 
 
Note: Each row in the table represents the linear regression estimates where the regressed variable is reported in the first column. 
In all cases, the regressors are the two factors of the Dynamic Factor Model (equations 6-7), although only the coefficient of the 
second one (Flight to Liquidity factor) is reported. We perform separate estimations for each country. Columns 2-5 report the 
estimations for the top 4 bond markets in the euro area. Columns 6-10 report mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard 
deviations of the coefficients estimated for those countries labelled core (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, 
and Finland), where the last column (10th) is the number of regressions where this coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% 
level. Columns 11-15 report mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard deviations of the coefficients estimated for those 
countries labelled stressed (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece), where the last column (15th) is the number of regressions 
where this coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% level. . Robust standard errors are used for the computation of the 
statistical tests. 
By contrast, the level of sovereign bond yields of all core euro area countries did 
exhibit significant decreases during FTL episodes, in line with the results for Germany and 
France. The average impact for all core markets as a whole is somewhat lower than for 
Germany, but smaller bond markets also benefited from those inflows and the standard 
deviation of the estimated effects suggests less heterogeneity than for the stressed countries. 
Those qualitative findings seem to be quite robust across yield measures. On average, the 
sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients using yield levels for benchmark bonds are 
broadly in line with those for the zero-coupon yields, as discussed above if anything 
somewhat higher as should be expected.  
ES DE FR IT MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG. MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG.
Impact on yields
Panel A: levels
Zero-coupons
2-year -1.517*** 3.099*** 2.958*** -0.552** 3,415 1,070 1,617 5,044 6 -31,610 49,171 -129,282 -0,552 5
5-year -2.367*** 2.692*** 2.466*** -0.868*** 2,625 0,747 1,076 3,301 6 -16,250 17,408 -49,103 -0,868 5
10-year -3.476*** 2.399*** 1.881*** -1.439*** 2,232 0,756 0,726 2,973 6 -10,161 7,520 -22,477 -1,439 5
Benchmark bonds
2-year -1.934*** 2.887*** 2.976*** -0.746*** 2,634 0,948 0,750 3,504 6 -35,449 51,366 -136,944 -0,746 5
5-year -2.812*** 2.538*** 2.490*** -1.106*** 2,686 0,854 1,034 3,651 6 -18,108 19,120 -54,050 -1,106 5
10-year -3.488*** 2.074*** 1.907*** -1.374*** 2,233 0,813 0,674 2,976 6 -13,685 12,430 -36,407 -1,374 5
Panel B: First differences
Zero-coupons
2-year 0.966*** -0.141 0.036 0.986*** 0,006 0,137 -0,141 0,283 0 1,163 0,447 0,853 2,053 3
5-year 1.053*** -0.223* 0.080 1.010*** 0,033 0,195 -0,223 0,395 1 2,263 2,203 1,010 6,650 3
10-year 0.789*** -0.299** 0.022 0.807*** -0,020 0,198 -0,299 0,341 2 0,382 1,665 -2,860 1,805 3
Benchmark bonds
2-year 1.616*** 0.111 0.026 0.993*** 0,183 0,180 0,026 0,568 1 11,076 17,244 0,993 45,484 5
5-year 1.264*** 0.068 0.262** 0.987*** 0,289 0,175 0,068 0,536 3 3,527 3,145 0,987 9,497 5
10-year 0.669*** -0.070 0.211* 0.609*** 0,184 0,167 -0,070 0,468 2 2,220 1,915 0,609 5,789 5
Impact on trading activity
Order-flow -146.842*** 72.352** -167.054** 58.356 20,869 128,024 -167,054 254,873 3 -14,111 71,138 -146,842 58,356 1
(buys-sells)
CORE (DE, FR, AT, BE, NL, FI) STRESSED (ES, IT IE PT GR)
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Table 4 Panel B results on first differences also suggest strong significant increases 
in sovereign bond yields for stressed countries, in theory those whose behaviour tends to 
exhibit a stronger upward trend and more symptoms of non-stationarity. The influence of FTL 
flows during the financial crisis in the euro area is also quantitatively important: for Spain it 
suggests a variation in 5-year sovereign yields of almost 80 basis points and around 60 basis 
points for Italian bond yields. In contrast, overall, the significance of the estimates drops for 
daily changes in the more stable bond yields of the core countries.  
4.1.1 TRADING ACTIVITY IN BOND MARKETS.  
Finally, we investigate the extent to which our FTL episodes also have an impact in bond 
trading activity that justifies those effects in sovereign bond yields. Unfortunately global trading 
activity in euro area bond markets is not available at daily frequency. We therefore employ 
order-flow (buy minus sell volumes) of transactions within the MTS interdealer market, by far 
the largest electronic trading system for the euro area bond market and has been already 
employed in several studies of the euro area bond market (e.g. Beber et al., 2009). 5
We find that trading activity is also significantly affected by FTL episodes, as reflected 
in order-flow activity in bond markets. FTL episodes are associated to negative changes in 
order-flow for stressed bond markets, for example Spain, suggesting an asymmetry in trading 
activity towards sell orders in those markets which is consistent with the upward pressure on 
bond yields we reported above. Furthermore, we also find a negative impact of FTL on order-
flow in all stressed countries. In this regard, the significance and magnitude of the coefficient 
for Italy is particularly important, for, as discussed above, the MTS share of overall trading 
activity in Italian bonds is particularly high. In contrast, the FTL impact on order-flow in core 
bond markets is, on average, positive although results do reflect some heterogeneity probably 
related to the differences in MTS share across countries that may explain the low significance 
of the estimated impacts. 
 Bond 
trading through the MTS system can take place on two different platforms, the pan-European 
EuroMTS and the domestic (national) ones. In its early years, the EuroMTS was the reference 
electronic market for euro benchmark bonds and those with a minimum outstanding value of 
EUR5bn, while the domestic (national) MTS platforms allowed for trading of all remaining 
sovereign bonds of euro area countries, but MTS gradually evolved to a symmetric dual-
platform trading system from 2006. Our empirical work is based on trading statistics 
consolidated across platforms. Despite those considerations, it has to be borne in mind that 
MTS market share differs across euro area countries, ranging even within the largest ones 
from being very high for Italy but much lower for Germany for instance, which may influence 
our results. 
4.2 Stock market performance during FTL episodes 
To assess the behaviour of stock markets during FTL episodes, we regress daily returns of 
the overall market and 10 different industry-specific portfolios (using the Datastream industry 
classification) on the two factors in our model, the FTS factor and our FTL factor. In addition, 
as stressed in Baele et al. (2013) it is important to note that the coefficient on FTL must be 
interpreted as an abnormal return during FTL episodes, but it does not indicate which 
portfolios perform best or worst during FTL episodes spells, as portfolios with positive 
(negative) FTL betas may have also high (low) market betas. 
                                                                            
5. MTS-system market share among the electronic trading systems in Europe was already 74% of daily average turnover 
in 2003, and has been further developed since them. 
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Table 5: Impact of flight to liquidity and flight to safety on stock markets 
 
Note: Each row in the table represents the linear regression estimates where the regressed variable is reported in the first column. 
In all cases, the regressors are the two factors of the Dynamic Factor Model (equations 6-7). Panel A shows the estimated 
coefficient of the first factor (flight-to-liquidity factor), and Panel B shows the estimated coefficient of the second one (Flight to 
Liquidity factor). We perform separate estimations for each country. Columns 2-5 report the estimations for the top 4 bond 
markets in the euro area. Columns 6-10 report mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard deviations of the coefficients 
estimated for those countries labelled core (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Finland), where the last 
column (10th) is the number of regressions where this coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% level. Columns 11-15 report 
mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard deviations of the coefficients estimated for those countries labelled stressed 
(Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece), where the last column (15th) is the number of regressions where this coefficient is 
statistically significant at a 5% level. . Robust standard errors are used for the computation of the statistical tests. 
Table 5 results indicate that FTL episodes during the euro area financial and debt 
crisis had a negative impact on stock markets, as stocks were indeed perceived as riskier 
assets during those episodes. Furthermore, in contrast to bond markets, the fact that both 
core and stressed countries’ stock markets display significantly negative daily returns on 
those days highlights the importance of accounting for such episodes to understand 
developments in euro area financial markets as a whole.  
At sector level, we find that the performance of most if not all sectors are significantly 
and adversely affected by FTL flows. Moreover, qualitative results hold for most if not all 
countries, and our results do not suggest any specific defensive sector in the event of such 
episodes. The standard deviation of the estimated impact coefficients across countries 
displays some strong variation across sectors but this may be related to the different weight 
of specific sectors across countries and the size of the stock markets. 
4.3 Economic confidence and FTL episodes  
The FTL episodes we identified in our analysis also coincide with a deepening of the 
economic crisis in many euro area countries. Although we identified FTL episodes using bond 
ES DE FR IT MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG. MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG.
Panel A: impact of flight-to-safety factor
Stocks (all sectors) 0.010 0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0,019 0,021 -0,061 0,003 0 -0,021 0,021 -0,051 0,010 0
Individual sectors
Oil -0.004 -0.035 0.002 0.027 -0,041 0,031 -0,094 0,002 1 -0,041 0,051 -0,123 0,027 0
Basic -0.047* 0.018 -0.005 0.018 -0,020 0,026 -0,065 0,018 0 -0,011 0,037 -0,057 0,040 0
Industrial -0.025 -0.015 -0.021 -0.042* -0,038 0,015 -0,055 -0,015 0 -0,032 0,009 -0,044 -0,021 0
Consumer goods -0.012 0.022 0.004 -0.038 -0,001 0,025 -0,042 0,034 0 -0,014 0,025 -0,038 0,032 0
Health -0.001 -0.011 0.008 -0.033 -0,007 0,013 -0,030 0,008 0 -0,047 0,065 -0,146 0,037 1
Consumer services 0.008 -0.031 -0.014 -0.036 -0,025 0,013 -0,043 -0,004 0 -0,022 0,018 -0,044 0,008 0
Telecom 0.033 0.009 0.038 -0.013 0,012 0,028 -0,047 0,038 0 0,024 0,038 -0,013 0,094 0
Utilities 0.015 0.007 0.009 -0.009 -0,003 0,010 -0,017 0,009 0 -0,004 0,020 -0,034 0,015 0
Financials 0.018 -0.015 -0.030 -0.012 -0,041 0,022 -0,071 -0,015 0 -0,017 0,027 -0,057 0,018 0
Technology 0.027 0.030 -0.048* -0.090* -0,017 0,026 -0,048 0,030 0 -0,032 0,043 -0,090 0,027 1
Panel B: impact of flight-to-liquidity factor
Stocks (all sectors) -0.125*** -0.043 -0.085** -0.099** -0,074 0,029 -0,133 -0,043 2 -0,096 0,021 -0,125 -0,059 4
Individual sectors
Oil -0.067 -0.141*** -0.087** -0.082* -0,104 0,046 -0,188 -0,059 3 -0,117 0,044 -0,193 -0,067 3
Basic -0.105*** -0.056 -0.065* -0.079 -0,082 0,031 -0,147 -0,056 1 -0,136 0,062 -0,255 -0,079 4
Industrial -0.093** -0.055 -0.065* -0.076** -0,078 0,025 -0,113 -0,044 3 -0,085 0,021 -0,123 -0,061 3
Consumer goods -0.059*** -0.017 -0.065* -0.080** -0,051 0,018 -0,070 -0,017 1 -0,038 0,046 -0,080 0,038 3
Health -0.109*** -0.033 -0.051 -0.082*** -0,067 0,032 -0,130 -0,033 1 -0,090 0,108 -0,263 0,077 3
Consumer services -0.103** -0.084*** -0.079** -0.093*** -0,062 0,023 -0,084 -0,021 4 -0,082 0,045 -0,120 0,007 4
Telecom -0.071 -0.006 -0.025 -0.064 -0,042 0,037 -0,110 -0,006 1 -0,012 0,179 -0,161 0,339 2
Utilities -0.115*** -0.045 -0.114*** -0.068** -0,071 0,028 -0,114 -0,036 2 -0,080 0,029 -0,115 -0,038 2
Financials -0.186*** -0.070* -0.134** -0.158*** -0,105 0,031 -0,153 -0,070 4 -0,171 0,034 -0,223 -0,120 4
Technology -0.033 -0.035 -0.086** -0.162*** -0,069 0,018 -0,086 -0,035 3 -0,049 0,057 -0,162 -0,009 1
CORE (DE, FR, AT, BE, NL, FI) CORE (ES, IT IE PT GR)
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market data only, the results in the previous section showed that the impact of FTL episodes 
was also significant on stock markets. This section explores the extent to which those 
episodes also affected confidence in the euro area economies and not only in financial 
markets. 
To investigate the contemporaneous relationship between the financial and the real 
economy dimensions of the crisis, in Table 6 we report results of regressions of changes in 
monthly indicators of consumer and economic confidence on the average of our FTL factor in 
the previous month to their release. We find strong evidence that the financial market 
turbulence associated to the FTL episodes were an important determinant of the deterioration 
in economic confidence. Importantly, as for the stock market, FTL episodes led to lower 
confidence in all euro area countries, both core and stressed, and not only in those whose 
bond markets were adversely affected by the liquidity outflows. Moreover, Table 6 shows that 
the associated confidence deterioration among euro area consumers is robust to the use of 
alternative indicators, which suggests that FTL episodes were interpreted as a signal of a 
deepening of the economic crisis in the euro area as a whole. We also report results for the 
FTS factor as such episodes are often link to negative returns in the stock market 
corroborating the findings in Baele et al. (2013), which stress the importance of accounting for 
the effects of these turbulences in financial markets on the real economy.  
Table 6: Impact of flight to liquidity and flight to safety factors on economic  
and consumer confidence 
 
Note: Each row in the table represents the linear regression estimates where the regressed variable is reported in the first column. 
In all cases, the regressors are the two factors of the Dynamic Factor Model (equations 6-7), although only the coefficient of the 
second one (Flight to Liquidity factor) is reported. We perform separate estimations for each country. Columns 2-5 report the 
estimations for the top 4 bond markets in the euro area. Columns 6-10 report mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard 
deviations of the coefficients estimated for those countries labelled core (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, 
and Finland), where the last column (10th) is the number of regressions where this coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% 
level. Columns 11-15 report mean, minimum, maximum as well as standard deviations of the coefficients estimated for those 
countries labelled stressed (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece), where the last column (15th) is the number of regressions 
where this coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% level. Robust standard errors are used for the computation of the 
statistical tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ES DE FR IT MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG. MEAN STD MIN MAX SIG.
Panel A: impact of flight-to-safety factor
OECD Economic Sentiment -14.791*** -15.054*** -16.511*** -18.322*** -19,287 3,630 -24,821 -15,054 6 -22,787 6,385 -29,908 -14,791 4
EC Consumer Confidence -0.953* -1.306 -1.589*** -2.709*** -2,307 1,438 -5,360 -1,113 6 -9,409 14,529 -38,440 -0,953 3
Panel B: impact of flight-to-liquidity factor
OECD Economic Sentiment -44.837*** -98.461*** -66.846*** -42.558*** -75,310 12,134 -98,461 -65,963 6 -20,543 24,801 -44,837 15,124 3
EC Consumer Confidence -7.746*** -12.832*** -2.581*** 0.386 -7,041 3,686 -12,832 -2,581 6 20,078 39,905 -7,746 99,383 3
CORE (DE, FR, AT, BE, NL, FI) CORE (ES, IT IE PT GR)
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Table 7: Impact of flight to liquidity and flight to safety factors on asset swap spreads 
 
Note: Each row in the table represents the linear regression estimates where the regressed variable is reported in the first column. 
In all cases, the regressors are the two factors of the Dynamic Factor Model (equations 6-7). Regressions are estimated in 
differences for both the Asset Swap Spreads and the factors, and robust standard errors are used for the computation of the 
statistical tests. 
 
flight-to-safety 
factor
flight-to-liquidity 
factor
BofA Merrill Lynch Asset Swap Spread Index
Euro Area Non-Financial 0.054 0.097*
Euro Area Financial 0.113*** 0.162***
Euro Area Government -0.026 1.222***
Periphery Non-Financial 0.066** 0.185***
Periphery Financial 0.106*** 0.196***
Periphery Government 0.276 1.032***
Non-Periphery Non-Financial 0.044 0.089*
Non-Periphery Financial 0.114*** 0.158***
Non_Periphery Government -0.631 0.010
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5 Concluding remarks 
By comparing sovereign and agency bonds (bonds with identical level of credit risk but 
different levels of liquidity), this paper analysed liquidity premia in three major euro area 
sovereign bond markets (Spain, Germany and France) between 2008 and 2013. We showed 
that such liquidity spreads reached more than 100 basis points during the euro area debt 
crisis, and identified flight to liquidity episodes above and beyond “flight to quality” or “flight to 
safety” spells.  
We then showed that accounting for flight to liquidity episodes is an essential 
element for a thorough understanding of developments in euro area bond markets in recent 
years. First, flight to liquidity flows contributed to explain the significant widening of intra-euro 
area sovereign spreads by increasing the yields of the bonds from stressed countries while at 
the same time lowering those from core countries. In addition, we showed that flight to 
liquidity episodes were associated with stock market declines and confidence deterioration in 
the euro area as a whole, that is, not only in stressed but also in core countries, and thereby 
aggravating the financial and economic crisis.  
The strong effects of flight to liquidity flows that we find in this paper suggest at least 
two areas for further research. First, a more thorough understanding of their effects in other 
market segments, like for example corporate bond markets, and the macroeconomy, for 
example on growth expectations, is important and such extensions of our analysis are already 
in our agenda. 
Our results also show that the effects of flight to liquidity episodes on bond and other 
financial markets are important for policy makers. Indeed, the timing and goals of some of the 
policy measures taken during the euro area debt crisis could be better understood by the 
intensity of flight to liquidity episodes. Assessing the impact of such measures, for example 
the sovereign bond purchases under the Securities Market Programme of the Eurosystem, on 
attenuating flight to liquidity episodes is another important avenue to explore. In this field, the 
original analyses of Eser and Schwaab (2013) and Ghysels et al. (2013) are seminal and the 
factors proposed in our paper could be added to their methodology to assess the 
improvements in liquidity of the SMP programme.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1: Yield curve of ICO and Spanish Sovereign bonds 
 
Note: Red dots represent yield and time to maturity of Spanish sovereign bonds; Blue dots represent yields and time to maturity 
of ICO bonds, while continuous lines represent the zero-coupon Nelson-Siegel yield curves. All data corresponds to the 
01/04/2011. 
 
Figure A2: Time variant coefficient in the regression between daily changes in French and 
German liquidity spreads 
 
Shadows represent periods of statistically significant negative correlation. The solid line represents the estimated parameter, and 
the dotted lines the 95% confidence intervals. Kalman filter parameters estimated: 𝛼� = −0.019; 𝜎�𝑣 = 6.366; 𝜎�𝑤 = 0.0006; 
?̂?0 = 0.820. 
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Table A.1: ICO Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
XS0268276473 15/09/2008 15/09/2006 3.600 
ES0200130435 18/12/2008 26/03/1998 5.000 
XS0088241772 18/12/2008 24/06/1998 5.000 
XS0169577714 22/12/2008 05/06/2003 3.000 
XS0236867247 16/03/2009 05/12/2005 2.875 
XS0297220641 15/09/2009 25/04/2007 4.125 
XS0285098710 01/02/2010 01/02/2007 4.000 
XS0366354875 27/05/2011 27/05/2008 4.375 
XS0436694607 30/06/2011 30/06/2009 2.121 
XS0441517660 27/07/2011 27/07/2009 1.920 
XS0403519068 09/12/2011 09/12/2008 3.375 
XS0417901641 16/03/2012 17/03/2009 2.875 
XS0502287203 15/04/2012 15/04/2010 1.480 
XS0301818166 23/05/2012 23/05/2007 4.375 
XS0437697740 02/07/2012 02/07/2009 2.500 
XS0633097299 16/05/2013 02/06/2011 3.875 
XS0525700778 15/07/2013 15/07/2010 3.750 
XS0386473267 10/09/2013 10/09/2008 4.500 
XS0452822520 18/09/2013 18/09/2009 2.500 
XS0408637022 20/01/2014 20/01/2009 3.500 
XS0485309313 10/02/2015 10/02/2010 3.250 
XS0485309313 10/02/2015 10/02/2010 3.250 
XS0513825280 30/04/2015 02/06/2010 2.900 
XS0528912214 28/07/2015 28/07/2010 3.750 
XS0455534692 16/09/2016 02/10/2009 1.200 
XS0428962921 20/05/2019 20/05/2009 4.375 
ES0200130369 28/12/2026 24/07/1997 6.750 
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Table A.2: KfW Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
DE0002760998 15/02/2008 15/02/2006 3.000 
DE0002760907 25/04/2008 20/02/2003 3.250 
DE0002760972 17/11/2008 05/10/2005 2.500 
DE0002760782 04/01/2009 01/04/1998 5.000 
DE000A0E83R2 19/01/2009 19/01/2007 3.875 
DE0002760923 17/04/2009 12/02/2004 3.500 
DE000A0E83S0 30/06/2009 04/07/2007 4.375 
DE0002760832 04/01/2010 08/09/1999 5.250 
DE000A0E83C4 05/02/2010 05/02/2008 3.750 
DE000A0NKXX4 09/04/2010 27/03/2007 3.875 
DE000A0E83D2 02/08/2010 31/07/2008 4.875 
DE0002760964 11/10/2010 16/06/2005 2.500 
DE000A0E83E0 22/10/2010 22/10/2008 3.875 
DE000A0XXM20 31/01/2011 29/01/2009 2.250 
DE000A0E9C91 08/04/2011 22/04/2008 4.000 
DE0002760840 04/07/2011 29/03/2001 5.000 
DE000A0KPWU7 14/10/2011 20/09/2006 3.750 
DE000A0Z1V18 05/12/2011 05/06/2009 1.875 
DE000A0XXM04 16/01/2012 26/11/2008 3.375 
DE000A1DAMF4 23/03/2012 23/03/2010 1.125 
DE000A0XXM87 21/05/2012 20/05/2009 2.250 
DE0002760873 04/07/2012 13/03/2002 5.250 
DE000A0S8KS8 12/10/2012 17/07/2007 4.625 
DE000A1DAMK4 17/06/2013 15/06/2010 1.250 
DE0002760915 04/07/2013 03/07/2003 3.875 
DE000A0E9DM0 11/10/2013 17/09/2008 4.375 
DE000A1K0UE1 15/11/2013 15/11/2011 0.875 
DE000A0XXM38 25/02/2014 25/02/2009 3.125 
DE0002760931 04/07/2014 29/04/2004 4.250 
DE000A1DAMJ6 10/04/2015 28/04/2010 2.250 
DE0002760956 04/07/2015 26/01/2005 3.500 
DE000A1EWEB2 16/11/2015 16/11/2010 1.875 
DE000A1H36V3 08/04/2016 19/04/2011 3.125 
DE000A0Z2KS2 04/07/2016 02/12/2009 3.125 
DE000A1K0UB7 07/09/2016 07/09/2011 2.000 
DE000A1DAME7 22/03/2017 22/03/2010 2.875 
DE000A0MFJX5 04/07/2017 30/01/2007 4.125 
DE000A1H36X9 15/06/2018 15/06/2011 3.125 
DE000A0SLD89 04/07/2018 16/01/2008 4.375 
DE000A0L1CY5 21/01/2019 20/01/2009 3.875 
DE000A1CR4S5 20/01/2020 19/01/2010 3.625 
DE000A1EWEJ5 18/01/2021 18/01/2011 3.375 
DE0002760980 04/07/2021 17/01/2006 3.500 
DE000A0PM5F0 04/01/2023 16/10/2007 4.625 
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Table A.3: CADES Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
FR0000571259 25/10/2008 02/02/1998 5.125 
FR0010295949 23/02/2009 23/02/2006 3.125 
FR0010093377 12/07/2009 23/06/2004 3.750 
FR0010173773 12/07/2010 22/03/2005 3.125 
FR0010718338 25/04/2012 29/01/2009 2.625 
FR0000571366 25/10/2012 27/03/1998 5.250 
FR0010249763 25/04/2013 04/11/2005 3.250 
FR0010660100 04/09/2013 04/09/2008 4.500 
FR0011147701 18/11/2013 18/11/2011 1.750 
FR0010120410 25/10/2014 11/10/2004 4.000 
FR0010831669 15/01/2015 08/12/2009 2.625 
FR0011185032 16/02/2015 24/01/2012 1.875 
FR0010163329 25/04/2015 09/02/2005 3.625 
FR0011008366 25/02/2016 16/02/2011 3.000 
FR0010301747 25/04/2016 08/03/2006 3.625 
FR0010456434 25/04/2017 12/04/2007 4.125 
FR0010143743 25/10/2019 21/12/2004 4.000 
FR0010767566 25/04/2020 10/06/2009 4.250 
FR0010198036 25/10/2020 27/05/2005 3.750 
FR0010915660 25/04/2021 29/06/2010 3.375 
FR0010347989 25/10/2021 25/07/2006 4.375 
FR0011037001 25/04/2023 18/04/2011 4.125 
FR0011192392 15/12/2025 01/02/2012 4.000 
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Table A.4: Spanish Government Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
ES0000011652 31/01/2008 15/07/1997 6.000 
ES00000120H2 31/10/2008 17/01/2006 2.900 
ES0000012882 31/01/2009 19/01/2004 3.600 
ES0000012064 30/07/2009 10/07/1998 5.150 
ES0000012239 31/01/2010 11/05/1999 4.000 
ES00000120E9 30/07/2010 12/04/2005 3.250 
ES00000120Z4 30/04/2011 15/01/2008 4.100 
ES0000012387 30/07/2011 19/09/2000 5.400 
ES0000012452 31/10/2011 12/06/2001 5.350 
ES00000121I8 30/04/2012 13/01/2009 2.750 
ES0000012791 30/07/2012 14/05/2002 5.000 
ES00000120L4 31/10/2012 16/01/2007 3.900 
ES0000011660 31/01/2013 15/07/1997 6.150 
EH988544 30/04/2013 06/10/2009 2.300 
ES0000012866 30/07/2013 15/04/2003 4.200 
EI263529 31/10/2013 15/06/2010 2.500 
ES00000121H0 31/01/2014 07/10/2008 4.250 
ES00000123D5 30/04/2014 12/04/2011 3.400 
ES0000012098 30/07/2014 07/12/1998 4.750 
EH885945 31/10/2014 07/07/2009 3.300 
ES0000012916 31/01/2015 28/06/2004 4.400 
EI169668 30/04/2015 09/03/2010 3.000 
ES00000123L8 30/07/2015 17/01/2012 4.000 
ES00000120G4 31/01/2016 20/09/2005 3.150 
ES00000122X5 30/04/2016 09/11/2010 3.250 
ES00000123J2 31/10/2016 06/09/2011 4.250 
ES00000120J8 31/01/2017 18/10/2006 3.800 
ES0000012783 30/07/2017 11/03/2002 5.500 
ES00000121A5 30/07/2018 19/02/2008 4.100 
ES00000121L2 30/07/2019 10/02/2009 4.600 
ES00000121O6 31/10/2019 02/06/2009 4.300 
EI109866 30/04/2020 20/01/2010 4.000 
ES00000122T3 31/10/2020 13/07/2010 4.850 
ES00000123B9 30/04/2021 24/01/2011 5.500 
ES00000123K0 31/01/2022 22/11/2011 5.850 
ES00000121G2 31/01/2024 16/09/2008 4.800 
EI153632 30/07/2025 24/02/2010 4.650 
ES00000123C7 30/07/2026 15/03/2011 5.900 
ES0000011868 31/01/2029 15/01/1998 6.000 
ES0000012411 30/07/2032 23/01/2001 5.750 
ES0000012932 31/01/2037 17/01/2005 4.200 
ES00000120N0 03/07/2040 20/06/2007 4.900 
EH984269 30/07/2041 28/09/2009 4.700 
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Table A.5: German Government Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
DE0001137131 14/03/2008 10/03/2006 3.000 
DE0001141422 11/04/2008 16/05/2003 3.000 
DE0001137149 13/06/2008 23/06/2006 3.250 
DE0001135077 04/07/2008 10/07/1998 4.750 
DE0001135093 04/07/2008 30/10/1998 4.125 
DE0001137156 12/09/2008 15/09/2006 3.500 
DE0001141430 10/10/2008 10/10/2003 3.500 
DE0001137164 12/12/2008 15/12/2006 3.750 
DE0001135101 04/01/2009 08/01/1999 3.750 
DE0001137172 13/03/2009 16/03/2007 3.750 
DE0001141448 17/04/2009 13/02/2004 3.250 
DE0001137180 12/06/2009 15/06/2007 4.500 
DE0001137198 11/09/2009 14/09/2007 4.000 
DE0001141455 09/10/2009 27/08/2004 3.500 
DE0001137206 11/12/2009 14/12/2007 4.000 
DE0001135135 04/01/2010 22/10/1999 5.375 
DE0001137214 12/03/2010 14/03/2008 3.000 
DE0001141463 09/04/2010 01/04/2005 3.250 
DE0001137222 11/06/2010 13/06/2008 4.750 
DE0001135150 04/07/2010 05/05/2000 5.250 
DE0001137230 10/09/2010 12/09/2008 4.000 
DE0001141471 08/10/2010 23/09/2005 2.500 
DE0001137248 10/12/2010 12/12/2008 2.250 
DE0001135168 04/01/2011 20/10/2000 5.250 
DE0001137255 11/03/2011 13/03/2009 1.250 
DE0001141489 08/04/2011 24/03/2006 3.500 
DE0001137263 10/06/2011 29/05/2009 1.500 
DE0001135184 04/07/2011 25/05/2001 5.000 
DE0001137271 16/09/2011 11/09/2009 1.250 
DE0001141497 14/10/2011 29/09/2006 3.500 
DE0001137289 16/12/2011 20/11/2009 1.250 
DE0001135192 04/01/2012 04/01/2002 5.000 
DE0001137297 16/03/2012 19/02/2010 1.000 
DE0001141505 13/04/2012 30/03/2007 4.000 
DE0001137305 15/06/2012 14/05/2010 0.500 
DE0001135200 04/07/2012 05/07/2002 5.000 
DE0001137313 14/09/2012 13/08/2010 0.750 
DE0001141513 12/10/2012 28/09/2007 4.250 
DE0001137321 14/12/2012 12/11/2010 1.000 
DE0001135218 04/01/2013 10/01/2003 4.500 
DE0001137339 15/03/2013 25/02/2011 1.500 
DE0001141521 12/04/2013 28/03/2008 3.500 
DE0001137347 14/06/2013 13/05/2011 1.750 
DE0001137354 13/09/2013 19/08/2011 0.750 
DE0001141539 11/10/2013 26/09/2008 4.000 
DE0001137362 13/12/2013 18/11/2011 0.250 
DE0001135242 04/01/2014 31/10/2003 4.250 
DE0001137370 14/03/2014 24/02/2012 0.250 
DE0001141547 11/04/2014 27/03/2009 2.250 
DE0001135259 04/07/2014 28/05/2004 4.250 
DE0001141554 10/10/2014 25/09/2009 2.500 
    
DE0001135267 04/01/2015 26/11/2004 3.750 
DE0001141562 27/02/2015 15/01/2010 2.500 
DE0001141570 10/04/2015 16/04/2010 2.250 
DE0001135283 04/07/2015 20/05/2005 3.250 
DE0001141588 09/10/2015 24/09/2010 1.750 
DE0001135291 04/01/2016 25/11/2005 3.500 
DE0001141596 26/02/2016 14/01/2011 2.000 
DE0001141604 08/04/2016 26/04/2011 2.750 
DE0001135309 04/07/2016 19/05/2006 4.000 
DE0001141612 14/10/2016 30/09/2011 1.250 
DE0001135317 04/01/2017 17/11/2006 3.750 
DE0001141620 24/02/2017 13/01/2012 0.750 
DE0001135333 04/07/2017 25/05/2007 4.250 
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ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
DE0001135341 04/01/2018 16/11/2007 4.000 
DE0001135358 04/07/2018 30/05/2008 4.250 
DE0001135374 04/01/2019 14/11/2008 3.750 
DE0001135382 04/07/2019 22/05/2009 3.500 
DE0001135390 04/01/2020 13/11/2009 3.250 
DE0001135408 04/07/2020 30/04/2010 3.000 
DE0001135416 04/09/2020 20/08/2010 2.250 
DE0001135424 04/01/2021 26/11/2010 2.500 
DE0001135440 04/07/2021 29/04/2011 3.250 
DE0001135457 04/09/2021 26/08/2011 2.250 
DE0001135465 04/01/2022 25/11/2011 2.000 
DE0001135473 04/07/2022 13/04/2012 1.75 
DE0001134922 04/01/2024 04/01/1994 6.250 
DE0001135044 04/07/2027 04/07/1997 6.500 
DE0001135069 04/01/2028 23/01/1998 5.625 
DE0001135143 04/01/2030 21/01/2000 6.250 
DE0001135176 04/01/2031 27/10/2000 5.500 
DE0001135226 04/07/2034 31/01/2003 4.750 
DE0001135275 04/01/2037 28/01/2005 4.000 
DE0001135325 04/07/2039 26/01/2007 4.250 
DE0001135366 04/07/2040 25/07/2008 4.750 
DE0001135432 04/07/2042 23/07/2010 3.25 
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Table A.6: French Government Bonds used for the estimation of the yield curve 
 
ISIN Maturity Issuance Coupon 
FR0105427795 12/01/2008 28/01/2003 3.500 
FR0108197569 12/03/2008 22/11/2005 2.750 
FR0000570632 25/04/2008 15/01/1998 5.250 
FR0105760112 12/07/2008 24/06/2003 3.000 
FR0109136137 12/09/2008 25/07/2006 3.500 
FR0000570665 25/10/2008 25/06/1992 8.500 
FR0106589437 12/01/2009 22/01/2004 3.500 
FR0000571432 25/04/2009 08/10/1998 4.000 
FR0106841887 12/07/2009 22/06/2004 3.500 
FR0110979178 12/09/2009 24/04/2007 4.000 
FR0000186199 25/10/2009 12/05/1999 4.000 
FR0107369672 12/01/2010 23/11/2004 3.000 
FR0000186603 25/04/2010 08/02/2000 5.500 
FR0107674006 12/07/2010 21/06/2005 2.500 
FR0113872776 12/09/2010 20/05/2008 3.750 
FR0000187023 25/10/2010 12/09/2000 5.500 
FR0108354806 12/01/2011 24/01/2006 3.000 
FR0000570731 25/04/2011 26/02/1996 6.500 
FR0108847049 12/07/2011 20/06/2006 3.500 
FR0116843519 12/09/2011 26/05/2009 1.500 
FR0000187874 25/10/2011 11/09/2001 5.000 
FR0109970386 12/01/2012 23/01/2007 3.750 
FR0000188328 25/04/2012 12/03/2002 5.000 
FR0110979186 12/07/2012 26/06/2007 4.500 
FR0000188690 25/10/2012 10/09/2002 4.750 
FR0000570780 26/12/2012 25/02/1987 8.500 
FR0113087466 12/01/2013 22/01/2008 3.750 
FR0000188989 25/04/2013 11/03/2003 4.000 
FR0114683842 12/07/2013 22/07/2008 4.500 
FR0010011130 25/10/2013 09/09/2003 4.000 
FR0010061242 25/04/2014 09/03/2004 4.000 
FR0010112052 25/10/2014 07/09/2004 4.000 
FR0117836652 15/01/2015 26/01/2010 2.500 
FR0010163543 25/04/2015 08/02/2005 3.500 
FR0118462128 12/07/2015 22/06/2010 2.000 
FR0010216481 25/10/2015 12/07/2005 3.000 
FR0119105809 25/02/2016 25/01/2011 2.250 
FR0010288357 25/04/2016 07/02/2006 3.250 
FR0119580050 25/07/2016 21/06/2011 2.500 
FR0000187361 25/10/2016 06/02/2001 5.000 
FR0120473253 25/02/2017 21/02/2012 1.750 
FR0010415331 25/04/2017 09/01/2007 3.750 
FR0010517417 25/10/2017 11/09/2007 4.250 
FR0010604983 25/04/2018 08/04/2008 4.000 
FR0010670737 25/10/2018 07/10/2008 4.250 
FR0000189151 25/04/2019 10/06/2003 4.250 
FR0000570921 25/10/2019 25/01/1989 8.500 
FR0010776161 25/10/2019 07/07/2009 3.750 
FR0010854182 25/04/2020 09/02/2010 3.500 
FR0010949651 25/10/2020 12/10/2010 2.500 
FR0010192997 25/04/2021 10/05/2005 3.750 
    
FR0011059088 25/10/2021 07/06/2011 3.250 
FR0011196856 25/04/2022 07/02/2012 3.000 
FR0000571085 25/04/2023 27/01/1992 8.500 
FR0010466938 25/10/2023 09/05/2007 4.250 
FR0000571150 25/10/2025 25/02/1994 6.000 
FR0010916924 25/04/2026 06/07/2010 3.500 
FR0000571218 25/04/2029 12/03/1998 5.500 
FR0000187635 25/10/2032 12/06/2001 5.750 
FR0010070060 25/04/2035 06/04/2004 4.750 
FR0010371401 25/10/2038 12/09/2006 4.000 
FR0010773192 25/04/2041 30/06/2009 4.500 
FR0010171975 25/04/2055 28/02/2005 4.000 
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